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PENNSYLVANIA GAS: TRUSTS, TAKINGS, 
AND JUDICIAL TEMPERAMENTS 
JOSHUA ULAN GALPERIN* 
When I arrived at the house in Pittsburgh, John Fleenor was on the roof. 
I had left Hartford, Connecticut by plane around 6:00 a.m. that morning, 
touched down in Pittsburgh on schedule, rented a car in record time, and 
made it to the house well before 9:00 a.m., which is when the home 
inspection was scheduled to begin. Nevertheless, at least a quarter hour 
early, John was on the roof and having a look around. 
John was a younger man than I had expected. In my limited experience, I 
had come to believe that home inspectors were contractors who had decided 
knocking on walls and looking at electrical panels was a better job for an 
aging handyman than the haul and grind of building and renovating. But 
John scrambled down the ladder in no time, shook my hand, and told me 
that the roof was in good shape. 
My wife and I had both been offered new jobs at the University of 
Pittsburgh, so we had travelled out over our winter break, looked at 18 
homes, found the one we liked, made an offer, gotten an acceptance, and 
here I was, less than a month later, for the home inspection. 
                                                                                                                 
 * Josh Galperin is a Visiting Associate Professor of Law at the University of 
Pittsburgh School of Law and the Special Advisor to the Environmental Law and Policy 
Program at the Yale School of Forestry and Environmental Studies. Before Joining the 
faculty at the University of Pittsburgh School of Law, Professor Galperin was the Director of 
the environmental Protection Clinic, Lecturer in Law, and a Research Scholar at Yale Law 
School. 
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After the roof, John looked at the main levels and then we made our way 
down to the basement. “Hmm,” John hummed. “It looks like something is 
happening down here.” 
Indeed, the basement floor was bowing, peaking in the center of the 
room, tapering down towards the utility closet in one direction and the 
closet doors in the other direction. It didn’t look good. It was obvious that 
we were not going to be setting up the room with a pool table, but was the 
bulge a problem? 
“I don’t think this is any problem,” John said with some confidence after 
poking around a bit. “The house obviously had some movement after the 
foundation was poured, but if it was still moving you’d see other problems. 
The walls might be cracked, the windows might not open, and the stairs 
would definitely be uneven.” 
We had just been over all those things, windows, walls, stairs, and all 
looked great. 
John warned me though, “look, I’m not a structural engineer so I can’t 
say for sure if you have a larger problem. Why don’t you call an engineer 
and have them confirm this so you can rest assured.” 
The very next day I was on the phone with Russell Kowalich. Russell is 
a home inspector and a certified structural engineer. As it turned out, 
Russell had been to my house before to look at the very same issue in the 
basement. After a little negotiation, Russell disclosed his previous findings. 
He assured me the bowing in the basement was a remnant and would not 
cause any structural problems. 
“A remnant of what?” 
“Off-gassing from the shale beneath the house, which was probably 
disturbed when they dug the foundation.” 
Shale is a type of below-ground sedimentary rock that tends to have 
fissures throughout its formation. In some shale, natural gas collects within 
these breaks in such quantities that with modern drilling technologies, 
businesses can economically extract that gas and make it available as a 
source of energy. This is the geological basis of the so-called hydraulic 
fracturing boom. In hydraulic fracturing, gas drillers will pump liquid into a 
shale formation to break apart the shale and force the stored gas to the 
surface. Apparently, when building a home it is possible to slightly disturb 
shale that is close to the surface, which can release much smaller quantities 
of gas. This, it turns out, is the sort of shale off-gassing that transformed the 
basement of my new home. 
Off-gassing from the shale beneath the foundation of my new home has 
practically nothing to do with hydraulic fracturing, but possibly you could 
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forgive an environmental law professor for immediately thinking about the 
hydraulic fracturing boom, particularly around Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. 
 
* * * 
Our realtor pointed me to the State of Pennsylvania’s website because 
the state wants to make sure that residents are aware of the risk of coal mine 
subsidence. There is a website dedicated to this very issue, which warns: 
“BE INFORMED Underground coal has been mined in Pennsylvania for 
more than 200 years. It extends throughout 43 of our 67 counties…. 
CHECK FOR RISK Over one million homes in Pennsylvania sit on top of 
abandoned mines.”1 
The mine subsidence check is not so much a way to decide whether or 
not to buy a home. It is a way to decide whether to buy subsidence 
insurance. I cannot say what I would have done if our home were above an 
abandoned mine, as many homes in Pittsburgh are, but I was awfully 
relieved to learn that there had not been mining in our neighborhood. No 
risk of subsidence for us. No need for insurance. And so we went through 
with the sale of the house, where I sit as I type this sentence. 
Hydraulic fracturing and coal mining, a century earlier, had much greater 
effects on Pennsylvania’s development, and on the law, than they had on 
my home-buying experience. But that both shale off-gassing and coal mine 
subsidence popped up in important ways even before I had actually moved 
to Pennsylvania prodded me to think more about both forms of energy 
extraction. 
As are many lawyers, I was aware of the historic case of Mahon v. 
Pennsylvania Coal Company, which is about coal mine subsidence.2 The 
case changed the way regulators and courts think about land restrictions.3 I 
am also well aware that hydraulic fracturing is having an obvious impact in 
Pennsylvania,4 and I recalled a conversation I had with a colleague in the 
                                                                                                                 
 1. PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, http://www.dep.pa. 
gov/Citizens/MSI/Pages/default.aspx, (last visited Sept. 1 2018). 
 2. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922). 
 3. E.g., Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Counsel, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992); Carol M. Rose, Mahon 
Reconstructed: Why the Takings Issue is Still a Muddle, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 561, 562 (1984). 
 4. E.g., Eliza Griswold, The Fracturing of Pennsylvania, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 7, 2011), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/20/magazine/fracking-amwell-township.html;  Jennifer 
Szalai, A Community Cracked Open by Fracking, N.Y. TIMES (June 13, 2018) 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/13/books/review-amity-prosperity-fracking-eliza-
griswold.html. 
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summer of 2017 about a recent Pennsylvania Supreme Court case related to 
hydraulic fracturing.5 
Eschewing grand ideas about some comprehensive theory of energy and 
environmental law, or Pennsylvania’s special role in this area, I thought I 
would explore something more modest. What, I pondered, could I learn 
from a close reading of both cases, a look at the historical context of each, 
and the way advocates and activists had received them? Perhaps nothing, 
but who knows? In moving to Pennsylvania, in preparing to teach law 
students here, it would not hurt to get to know two important cases a little 
better. In doing that, in closely re-reading the cases and their contexts, and 
in comparing them, I realized that they have very little in common. But they 
can teach us something about judicial temperament and the important 
distinction in law between analytical reasoning and policy outcomes. 
 
* * * 
Some 300 miles to the east of Pittsburgh, Scranton, Pennsylvania was the 
one-time epicenter of anthracite coal mining.6 The high energy density of 
anthracite, paired with its relatively clean burn made it a very valuable 
commodity.7 Valuable enough, in fact, that coal companies thought it worth 
the risk of extracting coal from beneath urban areas despite the fact that 
hollowing out the land below buildings posed a risk to property and lives.8 
Over two decades ago economics professor William Fischel investigated 
the subsidence problem.9 He travelled to Scranton and surrounding areas 
and discovered, to his own surprise, that while, thanks to subsidence “whole 
houses [had been] swallowed up, and reports indicated that lives were 
sometimes lost,”10 damage from subsidence he explained was, on the 
whole, “episodic and limited; cities were not literally falling into the 
earth.”11 The past, however, is not so different from the present. Then, as 
now, high-profile problems could convert, in the public’s mind, a real but 
limited threat into an intense and ever-present risk. What Fischel discovered 
was that just before the start of the 1909 school year, an underground mine 
                                                                                                                 
 5. Pa. Envtl. Def. Found. v. Commonwealth, 161 A.3d 911 (Pa. 2017). 
 6. WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGS: LAW, ECONOMICS, AND POLITICS 16 
(1995). 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. at 26–27. 
 9. See generally id. 
 10. Id. at 26. 
 11. Id. 
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collapse had felled a Scranton schoolhouse.12 The event roused public fears 
that eventually led to the famous case of Mahon v. Pennsylvania Coal 
Company.13 
To help assuage the public concern over mine subsidence, the 
Pennsylvania General Assembly passed the Kohler Act in 1921.14 The Act 
required coal companies to leave a pillar of coal in place to support a 
variety of different land uses including homes, schools, roads, commerce, 
and industry.15 The Kohler Act only applied, however, when the owner of 
the minerals, that is, the mining company, did not also own the surface 
property.16 
In the town of Pittston, just outside Scranton, H.J. Mahon owned a home 
and the land on which that home sat.17 Below that land was coal owned by 
the Pennsylvania Coal Company.18 In fact, Mahon had bought his land from 
his father-in-law, an executive with the Company.19 In order to challenge 
the validity of the Kohler Act, Mahon and the Company had strategized to 
manufacture a conflict for the court.20 Mahon objected to Pennsylvania 
Coal mining beneath his property because removal of the coal would, he 
argued, cause his home to collapse.21 
To the Pennsylvania Coal Company, the spring and summer of 1922 
would have seemed a good time to have the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
deciding their case. Anthracite coal miners had gone on strike that spring, 
making national news and straining the supply of coal.22 One might have 
expected a court to consider the limited availability of coal and therefore 
invalidate the Kohler Act, which may have further limited supply. But the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court upheld the Act, reasoning that it validly 
protects public safety.23 
Just as the mining strikes were ending in September of 1922, the litigants 
were heading to Washington, D.C. to argue their cause before the United 
                                                                                                                 
 12. Id. at 27. 
 13. Id. 
 14. An act regulating the mining of anthracite coal; prescribing duties for certain 
municipal officers; and imposing penalties, P.L. 1198 (May 27, 1921). 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Mahon v. Pa. Coal Co., 118 A. 491, 494 (Pa. 1922). 
 18. Id. 
 19. FISCHEL, supra note 6, at 18. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Mahon, 118 A. at 494. 
 22. FISCHEL, supra note 6, at 25. 
 23. Mahon, 118 A. at 496. 
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States Supreme Court.24 In December the Court issued its now famous 
opinion in the case, holding that the Kohler Act went “too far.”25 
Surprisingly, despite reaching the arguably conservative outcome that a 
state regulation was invalid, the liberal Justice Holmes authored the 
Supreme Court’s opinion in Mahon.26 Though his reasoning in the case is 
famously unclear,27 what Holmes seemed to do in this case was apply a 
substantive due process analysis. In his opinion, Holmes looked closely at 
the Kohler Act and asked whether it advances the interests it purported to 
protect: to wit, public safety.28 He determined that it did not.29 He likewise 
balanced whatever public purpose did exist against the burden the Kohler 
Act placed on Pennsylvania Coal’s mineral rights. Holmes determined that 
the burden on the Company outweighed any public safety benefits because, 
in this case, there was only a single home at risk.30 
Mahon has become a foundation of what we today call regulatory 
takings;31 the idea that if a regulation burdens property to a certain point, it 
is not merely a regulation but is tantamount to an appropriation of private 
property.32 This was a legal innovation, one that even Justice Scalia—who 
could not have been more ideologically different from Justice Holmes—
was fond of quoting. And in many of those quotes, Scalia made a point of 
mentioning Holmes by name. 
“Justice Holmes recognized in Mahon…that if the protection against 
physical appropriations of private property was to be meaningfully 
enforced, the government’s power to redefine the range of interests 
included in the ownership of property was necessarily constrained….” 
                                                                                                                 
 24. FISCHEL, supra note 6, at 25. 
 25. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922) (a Westlaw search on July 5, 2018 
shows that the opinion has been cited over 8,500 times).  
 26. Pa. Coal, 260 U.S. at 412. 
 27. E.g., William Michael Treanor, Jam for Justice Holmes: Reassessing the 
Significance of Mahon, 86 GEO. L.J. 813, 816, 830–31 (1998) (“Despite disagreement about 
precisely how to read Justice Holmes’s opinion in Mahon….”); Joseph F. DiMento, Mining 
the Archives of Pennsylvania Coal: Heaps of Constitutional Mischief, 11 J. LEGAL HIST. 349, 
397 (1990) (citing BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION 156 
(1977) (“The Opinion is ‘both the most important and most mysterious writing in takings 
law.’”)). 
 28. Pa. Coal, 260 U.S. at 413. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. at 413–14. 
 31. Treanor, supra note 27, at 814–15, citing Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. 
DeBenedictis, 480 US. 470, 508 (1987) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). 
 32. Treanor, supra note 27, at 814 n.6. 
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wrote Justice Scalia.33 “Prior to Justice Holmes’s exposition in [Mahon], it 
was generally thought that the Takings Clause reached only a direct 
appropriation of property….” Scalia also reminded his readers.34 Property 
rights advocates have been equally sanguine about the continuing impacts 
of Mahon, citing it, as the conservative Pacific Legal Foundation has, to 
argue against land use regulations.35 
Of course, at the very same time, Mahon has been a trouble spot for 
regulators, environmentalists, and liberal scholars seeking to make a case 
for more government flexibility or respect for values-based environmental 
protection. Professor Joseph Sax, arguably the godfather of modern 
environmental legal thought, wrote in 1971 that Mahon and the thinking 
that underlies it was “naïve” for thinking that property can be easily defined 
by only its economic values as Justice Holmes had supposed.36 
Although I was reminded of the Mahon v. Pennsylvania Coal case 
because buying a home in Pittsburgh forced me to consider whether the 
legacy of coal mining might swallow me whole, it’s hard to forget about a 
case that has had such national significance. The hydraulic fracturing boom 
over the past decade has likewise had national significance, but that stems 
from the way hydraulic fracturing has transformed the American energy 
landscape. Because almost all aspects of hydraulic fracturing are governed 
at the state and local level,37 there is no nationwide legal revolution on the 
horizon but there has been a revolution of sorts here in Pennsylvania. 
 
* * * 
In the summer of 1968, Franklin Kury read an article in the New York 
Times about a proposed amendment to that state’s constitution.38 The 
amendment dealt with what seemed like minutia of New York’s 
environment and natural resources, but it gave Kury an idea.39 Then a 
                                                                                                                 
 33. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1014 (1992). 
 34. Id. (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). 
 35. Brief Amicus Curiae of Pacific Legal Foundation and California Farm Bureau 
Federation In Support of Appellant County of Siskiyou at 24, Envtl. Law Found. v. State 
Water Resource Bd., (Aug. 10, 2017) (No. C083239) (available for download at 
https://pacificlegal.org/documents/ac-brief-environmental-law-fdn/). 
 36. Joseph L. Sax, Takings, Private Property and Public Rights, 81 YALE L.J. 149, 151–
52 (1971). 
 37. Grace Heusner, Allison Sloto & Joshua Ulan Galperin, Defining and Closing the 
Hydraulic Fracturing Governance Gap, 95 DENV. L. REV. 191, 196 (2017). 
 38. FRANKLIN L. KURY, CLEAN POLITICS, CLEAN STREAMS: A LEGISLATIVE 
AUTOBIOGRAPHY AND REFLECTIONS 74 (2011). 
 39. Id. 
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member of the Pennsylvania House of Representatives, Kury thought he 
could try something similar here in Pennsylvania. Rather than struggle over 
a detailed, geography-specific inventory, however, he would craft, in 
simple prose, an amendment to Pennsylvania’s Constitution putting forward 
two powerful concepts.40 What he wanted to forever enshrine in 
Pennsylvania law was “an articulation of the public’s interest in the 
environment” wrote Kury in 2011 “and the placement of the responsibility 
on state government to serve as a trustee of the state’s natural resources.”41 
Amendments to the Pennsylvania Constitution require approval by a 
majority of the House and Senate in two consecutive meetings of the 
General Assembly and then approval of the people of Pennsylvania.42 This 
is a series of five significant hurdles and in today’s politics its simply 
impossible to imagine that Representative Kury’s proposed amendment 
could succeed. But things are different today. On June 1, 1969, the 
proposed amendment passed the state house unanimously, 190-0, and the 
rest was easy.43 The proposal also passed the state Senate unanimously, and 
in the following session of the General Assembly, the proposal again passed 
both chambers without a single dissenter.44 
The proposed constitutional amendment was put to the people on May 
18, 1971.45 What is now known as the Pennsylvania Environmental Rights 
Amendment (ERA), Article 27 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, was 
approved by a 4-1 margin, with over 1 million Pennsylvanians voting to 
enshrine environmental protection in the state’s constitution.46 
In its entirety, the ERA reads: 
The people have the right to clean air, pure water, and to the 
preservation of the natural, scenic, historic and esthetic values of 
the environment. Pennsylvania’s public natural resources are the 
common property of all the people, including generations yet to 
come. As trustee of these resources, the Commonwealth shall 
conserve and maintain them for the benefit of all the people.47 
                                                                                                                 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. PA. CONST. art. XI, § 1. 
 43. KURY, supra note 38. 
 44. Id. at 75. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. PA. CONST. art. I, § 27. 
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Shortly after the new ERA took effect, a group of students from Wilkes 
College and several other citizens of the city of Wilkes-Barre tried to use 
the Amendment as a shield against a new road that was going to invade a 
neighborhood park.48 
The students brought their argument to the courts, claiming that because 
the park was a historic area the state’s constitution now prohibited the 
Department of Transportation from destroying any part of it with a road.49 
The court thought this was too absolutist an argument. The ERA “was 
intended to allow the normal development of property in the 
Commonwealth,” the court ruled in 1973, favoring “controlled development 
of resources rather than no development.”50 
Undergirding the ruling in this case, Payne v. Kassab, was that a literal 
reading of the ERA was, to the court’s mind, unrealistic. The court felt that 
application of the ERA to real-world cases must be “realistic and not 
merely formalistic.”51 To guide future courts in making “realistic” 
environmental decisions under the ERA, the court built a three-part test. 
First courts should ask if the state complied with the laws. Second, did the 
state make a reasonable effort to minimize environmental damage? And 
third, courts would need to balance the environmental harm of a state action 
against the benefits of that action.52 None of this analysis seemed imbedded 
in the text of the ERA, but the court sought to adapt a flexible standard that 
would allow for “normal development of property.”53 
The ERA, it seemed after the Payne ruling, had a very short life and a 
very minor impact. That state of affairs remained until hydraulic fracturing 
took hold in Pennsylvania over a decade ago. According to John Dernbach, 
a Professor at Weidner University Commonwealth Law School in 
Harrisburg, a leading expert on the ERA, it was when “the Marcellus Shale 
boom and economic recession happened—at the same time” that the ERA 
had its revival.54 
The first sign that things were about to change emerged in the now-
famous case of Robinson Township v. Pennsylvania.55 In 2012, the 
                                                                                                                 
 48. Payne v. Kassab, 312 A.2d 86, 88 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1973). 
 49. Id. at 93–94. 
 50. Id. at 94. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. John C. Dernbach, The Abandonment and Restoration of Pennsylvania’s 
Constitutional Public Trust, 49 No. 2 ABA TRENDS 10, 11 (2017). 
 55. Robinson Twp. v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 83 A.3d 901 (Pa. 2013). 
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Pennsylvania General Assembly passed Act 13 which, among other things, 
prohibited local town governments from regulating hydraulic fracturing 
operations within their borders. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court found 
that Act 13 was unconstitutional but was divided over the exact reasoning.56 
One group of justices argued that the Act was unconstitutional because it 
violated the ERA.57 This plurality of justices argued that the ERA requires 
Pennsylvania to act as a trustee for the environment.58 By removing 
authority over hydraulic fracturing from towns, and replacing that authority 
with very thin environmental protections, the state, said this plurality, had 
violated its duty.59 
Because the Robinson Township decision did not represent the reasoning 
of the majority of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, it was more guidance 
than law. But that would soon change. 
In 1945, Pennsylvania began a program of leasing a small amount of 
state land for oil and gas exploration.60 As part of that endeavor, the state 
created the oil and gas Lease Fund to house income from the program.61 
Money in the Lease Fund could only be used for conservation and other 
natural resource purposes.62 
This is where the recession and the shale boom come in. Pennsylvania 
found itself in a difficult financial situation just as hydraulic fracturing was 
promising to make major inroads in the state. This was an opportunity that 
was too good to pass up. “The state expanded drilling on state lands, 
bringing in hundreds of millions of dollars” Dernbach explained. According 
to the 1947 Lease Fund law, that money should have been used for 
conservation or natural resource management but, says Dernbach, instead 
the state “transferred much of that money to the General Fund to help 
balance the budget.”63 
The General Assembly had created the Lease Fund and the spending 
restriction was really meant to restrain bureaucrats. On first blush, there 
was no reason the General Assembly could not later decide to redirect 
                                                                                                                 
 56. Id. at 913. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. at 985. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Dernbach, supra note 54. 
 61. Pa. Envtl. Def. Found., 161 A.3d at 911, 919. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Dernbach, supra note 54, at 11. 
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money out of the Fund for purposes other than conservation.64 Or that was 
the thinking until the Pennsylvania Environmental Defense Foundation got 
involved. 
The Pennsylvania Environmental Defense Foundation is a tiny non-profit 
organization. Its website scrolls downward endlessly, a mishmash of fonts, 
typefaces, and colors looks like it may have been designed in the 1990s.65 
According to Pennsylvania’s Department of State, the Foundation’s net 
assets amount to less than $27,000.66 But the Foundation punches above its 
weight, which turned out to be a problem for those who wanted the fracking 
money for the state’s general fund and wanted to keep the ERA off the 
radar. The Foundation challenged the General Assembly’s redirection of the 
Lease Fund money, claiming that the ERA did not allow the diversion. 
On June 20, 2017, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court handed down its 
decision in Pennsylvania Environmental Defense Foundation v. 
Commonwealth (PEDF), agreeing with the Foundation and dramatically 
reviving the ERA.67 
The legislative process of managing state finances can be a slog and a 
significant portion of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s opinion in PEDF 
relates legislative details taking place over several years.68 What stands out 
about the court’s decision here are not these details, but two critical 
decisions they arrived at only after they waded through the legislative 
machinations. First, the Supreme Court explicitly decided to throw out the 
1973 rule from Payne v. Kassab that had for decades suffocated the ERA.69 
Second, in place of the Payne rule, the court insisted that the text of the 
ERA should control and that Pennsylvania trust law is the best tool for 
understanding the ERA.70 
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court said that the ERA created a trust. The 
body of that trust is the public natural resources of the state. The state of 
                                                                                                                 
 64. See Pa. Envtl. Def. Found., 161 A.3d at 911, 927 (“It further highlighted that the 
Lease Fund is not a constitutional creation but rather is a special fund created by legislative 
enactment, which could be altered by subsequent legislative action.”). 
 65. PENNSYLVANIA ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE FOUNDATION, http://www.pedf.org/, (last 
visited Sept. 6, 2018). 
 66. PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF STATE CHARITIES ONLINE DATABASE, 
http://www.charities.pa.gov/CharityDetail.aspx?315id2e%3d122a1, (last visited Sept. 6, 
2018). 
 67. Pa. Envtl. Def. Found., 161 A.3d at 911. 
 68. Id. at 919–25. 
 69. Id. at 930. 
 70. Id. 
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Pennsylvania is the trustee. The beneficiaries of the trust are the people of 
the state, including future generations.71 
Pennsylvania trust law imposes three specific duties. The duty of 
prudence means the trustee must exercise care in managing the trust.72 The 
duty of loyalty means the trustee must manage the trust only for the benefit 
of the trustees.73 The duty of impartiality means the trustee must consider 
the needs of all the various beneficiaries,74 which includes those now alive 
and future generations.75 
Using these principles of trust law, the court here decided that the state 
had indeed violated the ERA. Natural resources such as oil and gas, the 
court explained, are part of the trust. When the state decides to sell these 
resources, it gets, for instance, monthly royalty payments based on how 
much oil or gas is produced. These proceeds, according to Christine 
Donahue, the justice who wrote the opinion in PEDF, “are unequivocally 
proceeds from the sale of oil and gas resources.”76 Therefore, “[t]hey are 
part of the corpus of the trust and the Commonwealth must manage them 
pursuant to its duties as trustee.”77 
PEDF has not had almost a century of time to make waves, as Mahon 
has, but it is nevertheless, not without its champions and critics. Some, like 
Jim Willis, the editor and publisher of Marcellus Drilling News, declared 
that “radical environmentalists are causing chaos and confusion” in their 
use of the “Pennsylvania Supreme Court as a weapon” against drilling here 
in Pennsylvania.78 Others are taking a more nuanced tact. Attorneys Jordan 
Yeager, Laurel Williams, and Joseph Minott, representing a group of 
environmental clients, have argued that PEDF changes the way the 
Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection should conduct 
itself when making decisions on whether to permit new natural gas wells.79 
                                                                                                                 
 71. Id. at 931–32. 
 72. Id. at 932. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Dernbach, supra note 54, at 12. 
 76. Pa. Envtl. Def. Found., 161 A.3d at 935. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Jim Willis, Fractivists Use Pennsylvania Supreme Court As Weapon, NATURAL GAS 
NOW (June 25, 2017), http://naturalgasnow.org/fractivists-use-pennsylvania-supreme-court-
weapon/. 
 79. Appellants’ Supplemental Post-Hearing Brief Regarding Article I, Section 27 of the 
Pennsylvania Constitution at 1, 19, Del. Riverkeeper v. Commonwealth, (Aug. 21, 2017) 
(EHB Docket No. 2014-142-B) (available at http://ehb.courtapps.com/efile/document 
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In order to fulfill their duties as trustees, argue the lawyers, the permit 
writers need to be convinced that the potentially damaging activity will not 
degrade the local environment.80 
This is a major change from the status quo. It’s about precaution, Yeager 
explained when we spoke last winter. In the past, there was a presumption 
in favor of permitting but now, he thought, there may be a presumption 
against permits, placing the burden on the applicant to justify that their 
application is the result of science-based decisionmaking. And, Yeager 
hoped, over time this can shift agency culture.81 
 
* * * 
Mahon has become an icon of conservative and legal advocacy and 
PEDF may, within Pennsylvania and as a model elsewhere, become an 
equally important icon for environmentalists and progressive advocates. 
But as I read these cases, and read about them, and talk to people who have 
a stake in the law they present, I am struck by how their outcomes are so 
ideologically different from the judicial philosophies that they display. 
Mahon, as it turns out, is an expression of progressive judging sometimes 
called realism or pragmatism, while PEDF is an embodiment of 
conservative formalism. 
Justice Holmes, the author of Mahon, is famous for his embrace of realist 
judging, advancing flexible judicial analysis that empowers judges to inject 
subjective values into decisionmaking.82 Justice Donahue of the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court, the author of PEDF, is lucky enough to not 
(yet, at least,) be a pawn in any high-profile ideological tug-of-war. Thus, to 
demonstrate the ideological underpinnings in PEDF I will instead portrait 
the late Justice Scalia as the embodiment of formalism. Justice Scalia was a 
lion of judicial conservatism, a champion of what he saw as judicial 
restraint, which he advanced through formalistic, categorical rules that 
might be more objectively applied.83 
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In United States v. Mead Corporation,84 an administrative law case about 
when to grant deference to agency interpretations of law, Justice Breyer 
made a brief statement that nicely summarizes these competing ideas. 
Justice Scalia had dissented in that case, arguing for a categorical rule 
rather than the more ad hoc approach the majority took. In response to 
Scalia’s dissent, Breyer wrote “Justice Scalia’s first priority over the years 
has been to limit and simplify. The Court’s choice has been to tailor 
deference to variety.”85 
This hits it right on the nose. Scalia believed that the role of the judiciary 
is a classical one: to make the law simple and consistent, and then to place a 
given factual situation into one simple bucket or another. This does not 
leave as much space for case-by-case considerations of justice and equity, 
but it does have the benefit of greater certainty and it makes it harder for 
judges to apply their own preferences in decisionmaking.86 
In Mead, the Court was taking an ad hoc approach. This is an approach 
more indicative of progressive judging, the type of jurisprudence that 
Justice Holmes preferred, in which judges can look carefully at the facts of 
any given case and eschew categorical rule instead employing balancing 
tests and perceptions of reasonableness. That approach may result in a 
higher rate of decisions that seem fair, but it also permits judges to decide 
what is and is not fair based on their own belief system, which is not easily 
replicable. 
Of course, while conservative formalism promises consistency and 
progressive pragmatism promises fairness, these promises do not always 
come to fruition in practice. Nevertheless. 
This expectation of progressive jurisprudence embracing ad hoc 
balancing and fact-based justice or classically conservative jurisprudence 
holding tenaciously to categorical and formal approaches maps perfectly 
onto Mahon and PEDF, respectively. 
In Mahon the United States Supreme Court delivered an outcome that 
pleased (and continues to please) conservatives and yet, the analysis 
promotes Justice Holmes’ subjective balancing and flexible assessments of 
rationality and effectiveness. Mahon employed a vague standard of “too 
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far” and then compared the benefit of the regulation to the burden on an 
individual property owner to determine that the Kohler Act did indeed go 
too far.87 This balancing against an equivocal standard allows a judge to 
inject his own conception of what is best, what is needed, what is 
appropriate and it is exactly what we should expect from Holmes. As 
William Treanor, a leading Mahon scholar and Dean of the law school at 
Georgetown says, “Holmes rejected the categorical approach” and, Treanor 
continues, he “favored balancing.”88 
PEDF, as I discovered after a second and third reading of the case, is 
really a very formal opinion despite its progressive outcome. In PEDF, the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court did two important things. First, it overruled 
the law of Payne, the case the students brought to stop a road from 
encroaching on a local park.89 Payne was explicitly a flexible, pragmatic, 
decision that meant to give judges flexibility through its three-part 
balancing test.90 In overruling Payne, the PEDF court was clearing away 
judicial subjectivity, and they replaced it with the restraint of formalism 
because the second important thing that PEDF did was to create a very 
clearly defined, replicable, and categorical rule by using trust principles.91 
In applying the trust doctrine, the Court did not invent any new law, or 
even look closely at the nuance and justification for the General 
Assembly’s diversion of hydraulic fracturing-based income. Instead, the 
Court took a well-established body of law and applied it simply to the facts 
at hand.92 This is the classically conservative judicial model of Justice 
Scalia. As applied, the trust rules ask first if the property at issue falls into 
the trust category and then if the government activity violates any of the 
trust duties long enshrined in Pennsylvania law. This is not about judicial 
policymaking; it is about judicial restraint. 
 
* * * 
Moving to Pennsylvania has brought some changes. There are old coal 
mines roughly a half mile from my home and shale off-gassing immediately 
below it. But there is also an Environmental Rights Amendment in the 
state’s constitution. These sorts of contradictions seem to be popping up 
everywhere here, and not least in state politics. You may have heard that 
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Pennsylvania is a political swing state. Pittsburgh is a blue island of “I’m 
With Her stickers,” in a bright red sea of MAGA hats.93 Who would have 
thought that a United States Supreme Court case from 1922 about coal 
mining and a Pennsylvania Supreme Court Case nominally about state 
finances but practically about hydraulic fracturing would have turned up 
another set of contradictions? 
There may not be any great revelation here, just an example of another 
Northeasterner moving from one bubble to another. But as I settle into my 
new home, I am also settling into teaching a new crop of students that 
probably reflect the same political contradictions everywhere around me. If 
nothing else, I hope that what I’ve learned from Mahon and PEDF can help 
them consider their own commitments both political and in the law. 
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